The myth of occurrence-based semantics by Pickel, Bryan & Rabern, Brian
The myth of occurrence-based semantics∗
Bryan Pickel and Brian Rabern
University of Edinburgh
- forthcoming in Linguistics and Philosophy -
Abstract
The principle of compositionality requires that the meaning of a complex expression
remains the same after substitution of synonymous expressions. Alleged counterex-
amples to compositionality seem to force a theoretical choice: either apparent syn-
onyms are not synonyms or synonyms do not syntactically occur where they appear
to occur. Some theorists have instead looked to Frege’s doctrine of “reference shift”
according to which the meaning of an expression is sensitive to its linguistic context.
This doctrine is alleged to retain the relevant claims about synonymy and substitution
while respecting the compositionality principle. Thus, Salmon (2006) and Glanzberg
and King (2020) offer occurrence-based accounts of variable binding, and Pagin and
Westerståhl (2010c) argue that an occurrence-based semantics delivers a compositional
account of quotation. Our thesis is this: the occurrence-based strategies resolve the
apparent failures of substitutivity in the same general way as the standard expression-
based semantics do. So it is a myth that a Frege-inspired occurrence-based semantics
affords a genuine alternative strategy.
The principle of compositionality is a cornerstone of contemporary formal semantics. A
semantic theory is compositional for a language when the meaning of a complex expression
is determined by the meanings of the simpler expressions from which it is syntactically
derived. Minimally, this requires that the meaning of a complex remains the same after
substituting synonymous expressions while leaving all else the same. That is:
∗For comments and discussion, thanks to Michael Glanzberg, Nathan Klinedinst, Peter Pagin, and two
anonymous referees for Linguistics and Philosophy. Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the Context
and variables workshop at All Souls College in Oxford (2017), the What is Said–What is Meant workshop in Berlin
(2016), and the 2016 Mid-Atlantic Philosophy of Language Workshop in Morgantown – the paper benefited
from the questions and objections at these events. It would have, no doubt, benefited from Glanzberg’s
comments at the 2020 Pacific APA, but this conference was cancelled due to the pandemic.
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compositionality: If φβ differs from φα only by substitution of β for α, and β and α
are synonymous, then φα and φβ are synonymous.
Semanticists have been largely successful in assimilating problematic cases into composi-
tional semantic theories (see, e.g., Portner and Partee 2008).
Yet, certain recalcitrant cases remain, e.g. variable or pronoun binding, quotation,
attitude reports, etc. In these cases, we appear to have non-synonymous expressions φ
and ψ that differ only by the substitution of synonymous expressions α and β. Proponents
of compositional semantics are faced with a standard diet of options in response to these
apparent violations of the principle of compositionality.
deny synonymy: While the complex expressions φ and ψ do differ only by the
substitution of α and β, and perhaps there is some dimension of meaning along
which α and β are synonymous, there is actually another dimension of meaning
according to which α and β are not synonymous.
deny substitution: While α and β are synonymous, and perhaps it appears that φ
and ψ are syntactically related by the mere substitution of α and β, the expressions
φ and ψ do not actually differ only by the substitution of α and β.
Some find that this strict diet does not satisfy. The apparent counterexamples to compo-
sitionality force a theoretical choice: either the apparent synonyms are not synonyms or
the synonyms do not syntactically occur where they appear to occur. Those with wider
tastes look to an earlier tradition stemming from Gottlob Frege for dealing with apparent
counter-examples to the compositionality of what he called Bedeutung, or reference.
According to Frege, “the truth value of a sentence remains unchanged when an expres-
sion is replaced by another having the same reference” (Frege 1892/1952: 64). But Frege
observed that apparently co-referential terms such as ‘the capital of Scotland’ and ‘Edin-
burgh’ do not substitute salva veritate into various linguistic contexts. Standard examples
include (i) quotation contexts, (ii) propositional attitude ascriptions, and (iii) modal con-
texts. The sentences in the pairs (1), (2), and (3) differ by the substitution of ‘the capital of
Scotland’ for ‘Edinburgh’, but the first sentence in each pair may be true while the second
sentence in each pair may be false.
(1) ‘Edinburgh’ begins with the fifth letter of the English alphabet.
‘The capital of Scotland’ begins with the fifth letter of the English alphabet.
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(2) Pierre said that Edinburgh is beautiful.
Pierre said that the capital of Scotland is beautiful.1
(3) Edinburgh might not be Edinburgh.
The capital of Scotland might not be Edinburgh.
Frege proposed a radical response. Though the expressions co-refer, they may also “shift”
their reference in embedded contexts. In the case of quotation:
. . . a word standing between quotation marks must not be taken as having its ordinary
reference. (Frege 1892/1952: 58-59)
In the case of propositional attitude ascriptions such as reported indirect speech or modals,
the reference is the customary sense or cognitive significance of the embedded expression.
In reported speech, words are used indirectly or have their indirect reference. We
distinguish accordingly the customary from the indirect reference of a words; and its
customary sense from its indirect sense. The indirect reference of a word is accordingly
its customary sense. (Frege 1892/1952: 59)
So according to Frege, the referent of an expression is sensitive to the linguistic environment
it is embedded in. Occurrences of the expressions ‘Edinburgh’ and ‘the capital of Scotland’
co-refer when they are unembedded. But, the expressions acquire different referents when
they are embedded in quotation, propositional attitude ascriptions, or modal contexts.2
Some have seen in Frege’s remarks, a doctrine of occurrence-based semantics which
provides an attractive alternative to the standard diet of options.3 According to this
doctrine, an expression has meaning through its occurrences. And different occurrences
of the same expression type may differ in meaning. An occurrence of an expression in a
1Pierre may believe that the capital of Scotland is Glasgow.
2Frege’s 1879 theory of identity in Begriffsschrift could also be understood as an occurrence-based view
(as an anonymous referee suggested). For example when Frege says “[signs] suddenly display their own
selves as soon as they are combined by the sign for identity” (Frege 1879/1967: §8), this sounds highly
reminiscent of what Frege later says about quotational contexts in Frege (1892/1952). See a recent discussion
and reconstruction of Frege’s early view of identity in Pardey and Wehmeier (2019).
3In addition to Frege’s doctrine of indirect reference Salmon (2006) also relates occurrence-based semantics
to Frege’s infamous context principle. Yet, the context principle is primarily put to use in the Grundlagen in
relation to the “contextual definition” of number, and not as a general principle guiding the semantics of
indirect contexts.
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complex expression is an expression type paired with a “linguistic context” in the complex
expression, where a linguistic context is essentially a particular position within the syntactic
structure.4
It is thought that this doctrine can retain the relevant instances of synonymy but rel-
ativized to an occurrence: unembedded occurrences of ‘Edinburgh’ and ‘the capital of
Scotland’ may be genuinely synonymous. But the meaning of these expressions systemat-
ically shifts when they are embedded in various linguistic contexts. Because the meaning
of an expression is relativized to a linguistic context, proponents of occurrence-based se-
mantics must reformulate an occurrence-relative compositionality principle such as the
following.5
occurrence-based compositionality: If φβ differs from φα only by substitution of β
for α in linguistic context c, and β and α are synonymous in c, then φα and φβ are
synonymous (in an unembedded context).
It is thought that this alternative compositionality principle provides a systematic enough
foundation for semantics, and avoids the choice forced by the strict diet of standard seman-
tics. Proponents of occurrence-based semantics promise liberation from the constraints
of standard semantics. Thus, Glanzberg and King (2020) defend a classical picture of
semantics, whereby the semantic value of a sentence is a proposition, against a threat
from the compositional semantics of binding—they do so by positing various meaning
adjustments that are “triggered by syntactic environments”. Salmon (2006), similarly,
offers an occurrence-based alternative for variable-binding, which promises to avoid un-
palatable consequences of the standard approaches. And Pagin and Westerståhl (2010c)
argue that—in contrast to the standard semantics—occurrence-based semantics delivers
a compositional (in the occurrence-based sense) and straightforward account of quotation
4Pagin and Westerståhl gloss the basic idea as follows: “take a well-formed complex term s[u] and knock out
the constituent u. What remains, s[. . . ] is the linguistic context of that occurrence of u in s[u], the environment
of the argument place” (Pagin and Westerståhl 2010c: 394). They formally model this as a sequence of
derivation rules encoding the path in the derivation tree that starts from the root and ends with the relevant
node (Pagin and Westerståhl 2010c, §4.2). There are various choices for formally modeling linguistic context
depending on the specific syntactic framework, but since our key point is general, we needn’t make a strong
commitment. For further discussion of linguistic contexts (and occurrences of expressions therein) see Pagin
and Westerståhl (2010a: §3.8), Glanzberg and King (2020: 15-19), and Salmon (2006: 416-20).
5The principle of occurrence-based compositionality is essentially an informal statement of what Pagin
and Westerståhl define as LC-Subst(µ,C) (2010a: 400), and if rendered substitutionally Glanzberg and King’s
Strong Type Adjusting Compositionality is getting at the same idea (Glanzberg and King 2020: 18). See also
Salmon (2006: 430) and Pagin and Westerståhl (2010a: 260).
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allowing for cases of synonymous expressions embedded in not-synonymous quotational
constructions.
But, unfortunately, occurrence-based semantics does not deliver the results it adver-
tises. We will argue that full articulation of the theoretical commitments of occurrence-
based semantics demonstrates that the approach does not present a genuine alternative to
the standard diet of options. In fact, it collapses into one of the the standard strategies for
resolving apparent violations of compositionality; deny synonymy or deny substitution.
In §1, we examine how to best develop Frege’s observations into a systematic occurrence-
based semantics. In §2, we examine Pagin and Westerståhl’s occurrence-based semantics
as developed in their theory of quotation, arguing that it collapses into one of the standard
responses and thus does not meet their own desiderata. In §3, we show that the occurrence-
based semantics for variable binding in first-order logic developed in Salmon (2006) is not
a genuine alternative, and that for similar reasons, the type-adjusting approach provided
by Glanzberg and King (2020) for the semantics of natural language binding also collapses
into one of the standard options. We conclude with a methodological lesson.6
1 Fregean reference shifts and occurrence-based semantics
Above, we described three pairs (1), (2), and (3) which differ merely by the substitution
of the co-referential terms ‘the capital of Scotland’ and ‘Edinburgh’. The first sentence
in each pair may be true while the second, false. Frege explained substitution failures of
these types by arguing that the particular uses (in the relevant sentences) of ‘the capital of
Scotland’ and ‘Edinburgh’, in fact, have different referents. The customary referents of ‘the
capital of Scotland’ and ‘Edinburgh’ are the same city. But as they occur embedded under
quotation marks, propositional attitude ascriptions, and modal operators, respectively,
Frege thinks that these expressions have distinct referents. Consider again the pair (1):
(1) ‘Edinburgh’ begins with the fifth letter of the English alphabet.
‘The capital of Scotland’ begins with the fifth letter of the English alphabet.
According to Frege, the uses of ‘the capital of Scotland’ and ‘Edinburgh’ in (1) refer to
themselves, and thus such uses are not co-referential. Frege tells an analogous story about
6The lessons here apply more generally to the “switcher semantics” developed in, e.g., of Pagin and Glu¨er
(2006), Pagin (2019), and Packale´n (2016).
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propositional attitude and modal contexts, whereby in such contexts words refer to their
customary senses. In this way Frege insists that an expression can have different referents
in its different occurrences in different linguistic contexts.
Proponents of occurrence-based semantics believe this Fregean idea can be imple-
mented so as to expand our standard diet of options concerning apparent failures of
compositionality. We believe otherwise. Following Kaplan (1964: 22-23) we distinguish
two methods for implementing Frege’s proposal.7 There are those employing the method
of direct discourse and those employing the method of indirect discourse. The method of direct
discourse uses distinct expressions in the formalism in order to explain apparent substi-
tution failures such as (1). The method of indirect discourse uses the same expression, but
offers more complicated semantic rules which allow the expression to make different truth
conditional contributions in its different occurrences, to explain the substitution failures
(Kaplan 1964: 27-8). Properly articulating each approach requires some care. But doing
so reveals that neither approach expands the standard diet of options.
1.1 The method of direct discourse
The method of direct discourse corresponds to an utterly banal way in which an expres-
sion might have different meanings in different linguistic contexts and thereby lead to
substitution failures. The expression ‘bank’ might be used as a synonym for ‘financial
institution’. But now consider the fact that the first sentence of the pair (4) may be true
while the second sentence is false. Thus, (4) is an apparent violation of the principle of
compositionality.
(4) I parked my boat on the bank.
I parked my boat on the financial institution.
In particular, the first sentence may be true without the second sentence being true because
‘bank’ may be used to mean something other than financial institution, viz. the land that
lines the river. That is, ‘bank’ is ambiguous. It has two meanings. In a properly regimented
language, it would be regimented by two different expressions. On the relevant readings
of the sentences in (4), they do not differ by the substitution of synonymous expressions.
So, the sentences in (4) are not a genuine violation of the principle of compositionality.
7See also the discussion in Klement (2002: chapter 4).
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The method of direct discourse explains the differences in truth-value of the sentences
in the pairs (1), (2), and (3) just as we have explained the difference in truth-value of the
sentences in (4). According to Kaplan, “[t]his then is Frege’s treatment of intermediate
contexts—obliquity indicates ambiguity” (Kaplan 1968: 184). To analyse the ambiguity,
we introduce distinct symbols with different meanings, just as we might differentiate
the two uses of ‘bank’ by writing a subscript, e.g. ‘bank1’ and ‘bank2’. As Kaplan
(ibid.) says, Frege’s approach has the effect of “indicating (some would say, postulating)
ambiguities where others have seen only opacity.” Positing ambiguity when faced with an
apparent compositionality failure is, of course, among our standard options, namely deny
substitution. Thus this would seem to foreclose the possibility of a novel occurrence-
based semantics arising from Frege’s insight. If occurrence-based semantics is meant to
provide a genuine alternative to the standard diet of options, it can’t be derived from this
interpretation of the Fregean approach.8
Some of Frege’s own remarks in a letter to Russell do suggest the method of direct
discourse.
To avoid ambiguity, we ought really to have special signs in indirect speech, though
their connection with the corresponding signs in direct speech should be easy to
recognize. (Frege 1902/1980: 153)
Because he treats a word such as ‘Edinburgh’ as referring to different things depending on
whether it is embedded, Frege sees the word as ambiguous across these uses. The ambi-
guity is to be resolved in our formalism by introducing different symbols corresponding
to each use.9
But a subtle reading of this passage raises questions about Frege’s intent. Having
observed that Frege suggests that the terms embedded in indirect speech and those in
direct speech should have a connection, Kripke (2008: 190) asks “are they independent
symbolic expressions or are they not?” Kripke continues:
8See Goodman and Lederman (2019) for a recent discussion and criticism of Frege’s ambiguity strategy.
And see Pickel and Rabern (in review) for a reply.
9Frege doesn’t actually implement this idea (nor any other way of treating indirect contexts) into his official
formalism, but in the letter to Russell he uses the device of underlining to distinguish customary and indirect
reference. Church’s formalization of Frege explicitly adopts the method of direct discourse, where he uses
subscripts to disambiguate (see his Logic of Sense and Denotation in Church 1951). See also Introduction to
Mathematical Logic where Church speaks of “eliminating the oblique uses of names by introducing special
names to denote the senses which other names express” (Church 1956: 8). See also Klement (2002: chapter 4).
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And of course though ‘London’ primarily refers to a great city in England, it is also
the name of a city in Ontario (Canada), and for all I know other cities. [. . . ] According
to Kaplan, Frege’s theory of direct and indirect quotation . . . is that the ambiguity in
these contexts is similar. In direct and indirect quotation contexts phrases do not have
their usual denotation. So far so good, and no doubt this is Frege’s theory. [footnote
29] But it is significant that these are not ordinary ambiguities or unusual references
unlike . . . the ‘London’ example. For in Frege’s theory of indirect quotation and the
like, the unusual references are determined entirely from the context. In the other
examples the unusual reference can often be guessed from the context, but it is not
determined by any semantic rule. (Kripke 2008: 189-90)
Thus according to Kripke, Frege’s theory should not be assimilated to ordinary ambiguity—
instead it should be understood as something more systematic and rule-governed. Those
who are inclined to emphasize this difference between ordinary ambiguities and Fregean
“reference shift” must develop a semantics which can systematically predict the shifty
behaviour of an expression across various linguistic contexts.
1.2 The method of indirect discourse
If the Fregean doctrine of “reference shift” points to something more subtle and systematic
how should it be understood? The method of indirect discourse points the way forward.
Rather than semantically analyzing the different contributions of an expression in its dif-
ferent occurrences by introducing two expressions which univocally make these different
contributions, the method of indirect discourse complicates the semantics for the single
expression.
A heavy handed way of complicating the semantics would be to introduce different
interpretation functions that are operative for different occurrences. Consider, for example,
the occurrences of ‘Edinburgh’ in (5) and (6).
(5) ‘Edinburgh’ refers to Edinburgh.
(6) “Edinburgh” refers to ‘Edinburgh’
One would like to say that ‘Edinburgh’ occurs four times in these two sentences: once
unquoted, twice in single quotes, and once in double quotes. One might introduce three
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interpretation functions: J.K$ which is operative in unquoted contexts, J.K£ which is opera-
tive in single quoted contexts, and J.Ke which is operative in double quoted contexts. On
such a view, the single expression ‘Edinburgh’ can make three different truth conditional
contributions in its different occurrences. It can contribute JEdinburghK$, which is a city;
or JEdinburghK£, which is a name of a city, or JEdinburghKe, which is the quote name of
the name of a city.
One might hope that this sort of approach—which seems to make good on Frege’s claim
that uses of names under (single) quotation marks contribute themselves—provides the
promising occurrence-based alternative to the standard diet of options. But we deny that
it provides such an alternative. In particular, insofar as the approach explains substitution
failures, it does so by denying that the substituted expressions are synonymous.
To see this consider the fact that standard cases of ambiguity such as ‘bank’ can also
be treated using different interpretation functions. So, rather than introducing distinct
expressions to explain the ambiguity in ‘bank’, the method of indirect discourse would
introduce two interpretation functions J.KR and J.KF. Each interpretation function gives
a disambiguation of ‘bank’, where JbankKF is a financial institution but JbankKR is the
lining of a river. Now consider again the apparent substitution failure in (4). Insofar
as the sentences ‘I parked my boat on the bank’ and ‘I parked my boat on the financial
institution’ differ in truth-value, it is because they are being evaluated with respect to the
interpretation function J.KR.
JI parked my boat on the bankKR , JI parked my boat on the financial institutionKR
But this interpretation function distinguishes these two sentences only because it yields
different meanings for the parts. Namely, JbankKR , Jfinancial institutionKR. Thus, insofar
as the sentences in (4) differ in truth-value, they do so because their components differ in
meaning.
The comparison with ambiguity brings out another problem. As formulated thus far,
the variation in meanings is bound to strike one as unsystematic. It is not governed by
semantic rules. There doesn’t seem to be any interesting relation between interpretations
such as J.K$, which is operative in unquoted contexts, and J.K£, which is operative in single
quoted contexts. This brings the same sorts of ills as ambiguity. For instance, without
some sort of systematic relation among the meaning functions, one will seemingly have
to learn them separately just as one learns the different lexical entries corresponding
to ‘bank’ separately. The fact that these different meaning functions apply in different
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linguistic contexts doesn’t help distinguish this treatment from an ambiguity analysis,
since the different lexical entries corresponding to an ambiguous word such as ‘can’ will
be determined by whether it occurs as a common noun or modal verb. The problem is
exacerbated when one reflects upon the fact that quotation is recursive: one can always
quote a quoted expression. So we need infinitely many interpretation functions, one for
each level of quotation embedding. (Similar remarks may apply to analogous treatments
of variable binding and attitude embeddings.)
Instead one wants to say that each expression is governed by a single semantical
rule that allows it to make different truth conditional contributions in different linguistic
contexts. The method of indirect discourse requires articulating this semantic rule for an
expression. For example, on such an approach, the expression ‘Edinburgh’ is governed
by a single linguistic rule determining that the expression refers to Edinburgh while
unembedded and to the expression itself when embedded in a single quotation marks.
On this implementation of the method of indirect discourse, the meaning of ‘Edinburgh’
has then been intensionalized. Rather than being a city, the meaning of ‘Edinburgh’ is given
by a function from linguistic contexts to its values in these contexts. That is, the meaning
of an expression will be given by a single interpretation function J.K. Given an expression
such as ‘Edinburgh’, the meaning JEdinburghK will itself be a function from linguistic
contexts into occurrence meanings. In certain linguistic contexts c, JEdinburghK(c) will be
a city. But in another context c∗, JEdinburghK(c∗) will be the expression ‘Edinburgh’.
This version of the method of indirect discourse does not expand the options for
responding to substitution failures either. The failure of ‘Edinburgh’ and ‘the capital
of Scotland’ to substitute in (1) would be explained by the fact that these expressions
themselves have different meanings. It is therefore an application of deny synonymy.
1.3 Occurrence-based semantics
Advocates of occurrence-based semantics nevertheless insist that Frege’s remarks point
the way to a novel solution to problems of substitution. They do so by insisting that
occurrences—expressions in linguistic contexts—are the fundamental bearers of meaning.
One way to implement this would be to frame the semantic axioms using a two-placed in-
terpretation function (Pagin and Westerståhl 2010c). The function takes both an expression
and a linguistic context as arguments and outputs an occurrence meaning.
J.K: (expressions × linguistic contexts) −→ occurence meanings
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An expression such as ‘Edinburgh’ will have a single lexical entry which for any linguistic
context c assigns a meaning to that expression in context.
Advocates of occurrence-based semantics insist that this approach carries an important
pay-off. There is no such thing as the semantic value of ‘Edinburgh’, JEdinburghK, or the
semantic value of ‘the capital of Scotland’, Jthe capital of ScotlandK. There are only the
meanings of these expressions at some particular linguistic context c: JEdinburghKc andJthe capital of ScotlandKc. ‘Edinburgh’ and ‘the capital of Scotland’ are synonymous as
they occur in contexts such as ‘Edinburgh is rainy’ and ‘the capital of Scotland is rainy’,
but not in the context of quotation such as those in (1).
This approach is underspecified at a crucial point: what—if anything—is the semantic
value of an expression type. On one view, each expression-context pair has its own lexical
entry. On this view, ‘Edinburgh’ as it occurs in ‘Edinburgh is the capital of Scotland’ has a
different lexical entry from ‘Edinburgh’ as it occurs in “‘Edinburgh’ begins with the fifth
letter of the English alphabet”. On the alternative view, these various meanings in context
are subsumed under a more general lexical entry for the expression type. On this view,
there is a single semantic value for ‘Edinburgh’ that determines its occurrence meanings
across the various contexts.
Unfortunately for the occurrence-based semanticist, neither option—viewing the mean-
ings of expressions in context as basic or as subsumed under a larger semantics for ex-
pression types—expands the range of possible replies to puzzles arising from substitution.
Taking each expression in context to have its own semantic axiom is implausibly unsys-
tematic. It again raises the spectre of ambiguity. On the other hand, taking the various
occurrence meanings to follow from the meaning of the expression itself simply intension-
alizes the meaning and therefore is a version of deny synonymy.
In what follows we will examine occurrence-based responses to two substitution puz-
zles. These responses purport to be outside of the standard diet options. However, we
show that once the proposals are made precise they fall in line with options from the stan-
dard diet. That is, they are ultimately variants of deny substitution or deny synonymy.
2 Pure quotation
As we have intimated, a kind of stress test for compositionality is the problematic case of
quotation—what happens when language is turned upon itself? Assume that the name
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‘Edinburgh’ occurs as a syntactic constituent of this sentence (the one you are currently
reading), as the orthography suggests. Thus, the application of quote marks is a genuine
syntactic operation—that is, a quote phrase is a complex expression derived from applying
quotes to an expression.10 Let’s represent an expression α embedded under quotes in the
object language as follows: quote α. Quoted expressions refer to expressions and thus the
semantics should yield the following:
Jquote EdinburghK = ‘Edinburgh’
Jquote the capital of ScotlandK = ‘the capital of Scotland’
The problem with compositionality is that ‘Edinburgh’ and ‘the capital of Scotland’ co-
refer, that is JEdinburghK = Jthe capital of ScotlandK. By the principle of compositionality,
if two expressions such as ‘quote Edinburgh’ and ‘quote the capital of Scotland’ differ only
by the substitution of synonymous terms, then the complex expressions themselves are
synonymous. It would follow that Jquote EdinburghK = Jquote The capital of ScotlandK,
which is false.
The problem here is not simply due to the assumption that the semantic value of a
name or definite description is its referent, the problem generalizes. Take any distinct
but synonymous expressions α and β. By assumption the expressions have the same
semantic value, JαK = JβK, but since they are distinct expressions their quotations must
differ in value: Jquote αK , Jquote βK. Yet by compositionality, Jquote αK = Jquote βK, since
these expressions differ only by the substitution of synonyms. Thus, if quotation is a
genuine syntactic operation, and there are distinct but synonymous expression types in
the language, then quotation is not compositional. The obvious thing to do at this point is
call into question some of the assumptions that lead to the failure of compositionality.
The standard diet of options provides two choices: deny synonymy or deny substitu-
tion. To deny deny synonymy one would deny that the purported dimension of meaning
whereby JαK = JβK exhausts the meaning of α and β—there is a richer notion of meaning
according to which α and β differ. But since this claim will have to be generalized for any
pair of simple expressions α and β this amounts to claiming that there are no two lexically
distinct (quotable) expressions α and βwhich have the same meaning. Thus, the semantic
10The key assumption here is that there is a syntactic rule which when applied to an expression α yields the
quote name of α. So alternatively we could talk about the derivation rule quote and the result of applying the
rule to an expression quote(α). Compositionality is threatened, since it requires a rule that maps the semantic
value of α to the semantic value of quote(α).
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theory will be compositional but only trivially so—the antecedent of compositionality is
false for any distinct α and β.
Due to the absurdly fine-grained meanings such a strategy must posit and the resulting
trivialization of compositionality a more popular approach traditionally has been to deny
that quotation is a syntactic operation, in others words deny that the word ‘Edinburgh’
occurs as a syntactic constituent of the following sentence:
‘Edinburgh’ begins with the fifth letter of the English alphabet.
In terms of our standard diet this strategy is to deny substitution. This type of view has
been endorsed in one form or another by many theorists, e.g. it was endorsed by Tarski
1936/1956 (cf. Quine 1940: 26), when he said that expressions surrounded by quotes
. . . may be treated like single words of a language, and thus like syntactically simple
expressions. The single constituents of these names—the quotation marks and the
expressions standing between them—fulfil the same function as letters and complexes
of successive letters in single words. Hence they can possess no independent meaning.
(159)
While a popular view, theorists have been dissatisfied with the idea that quotations are
syntactically simple expressions, e.g. Davidson complains as follows:
If quotations are structureless singular terms, then there is no more significance to the
category of quotation mark names than to the category of names that begin and end
with the letter ‘a’ (‘Atlanta’, ‘Alabama’, ‘Alta’, ‘Athena’, etc.). On this view, there is
no relation, beyond an accident of spelling, between an expression and the quotation
mark name of that expression. (Davidson 1979: 30)
It seems that an approach which accounts for the non-accidental nature of these connec-
tions would be preferable.11
11Davidson famously put forward his own alternative, which agrees that ‘Edinburgh’ does not occur as a
syntactic constituent of “ ‘Edinburgh’”, whereby quotation marks are demonstratives (roughly equivalent to
‘that expression’): “The singular term is the quotation marks, which may be read ‘the expression a token of
which is here’ [. . . ] the inscription inside does not refer to anything at all, nor is it part of any expression that
does. Rather it is the quotation marks that do all the referring, and they help to refer to a shape by pointing out
something that has it.” (Davidson 1979: 90). Note that one could agree with Davidson that quotation marks
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As we have said, Pagin and Westerståhl promise that occurrence-based semantics
provides an attractive alternative. In particular, they argue one can offer what they call a
“straightforward” semantics for quotation without having to deny substitution or deny
synonymy. They call these desiderata (a) and (b), respectively.12
A straightforward account of (the use of quote marks in) pure quotation is one which (a)
takes the quoted phrase to be a syntactic constituent of the quoting phrase (the quoted
phrase surrounded by quote marks), and (b) allows at least one case of two syntactically
distinct and quotable expressions having the same semantic interpretation (meaning).
(Pagin and Westerståhl 2010c: 382)
Pagin and Westerståhl (2010b) reformulate the interpretation relation J.K “so that it takes a
context type as additional argument, where we have one default context type for ordinary
use, and a distinct one for quotation, and similarly for the semantic operations ” (275).13
Pagin and Westerståhl model a linguistic context as a sequence of derivation rules
encoding the path in the derivation tree that starts from the root and ends with the
relevant node. So, for example, consider these three expressions:
(i) Edinburgh
(ii) ‘Edinburgh’
(iii) “ ‘ Edinburgh’ ”
In (i)-(iii) the name ‘Edinburgh’ occurs in three different linguistic contexts. Where quote
is the derivation rule for pure quotation it first occurs in (i) unquoted, the null context
〈〉, and then in (ii) quoted in the context 〈quote〉, and finally in (iii) it occurs in quotes
within quotes, so the context 〈〈quote〉, 〈quote〉〉. According to Pagin and Westerståhl’s
occurrence-based approach the three occurrences of ‘Edinburgh’ each have a different
semantic value. The occurrence in 〈〉 has a city as its value, the occurrence in 〈quote〉 has
are demonstratives (‘the expression which is my syntactic sister’) and insist that the expression ‘Edinburgh’
occurs as a syntactic sister to the quotes. This contextualist account is worth considering. But we don’t take
any official stand on the syntax and semantics of quotation in this paper, since our aim is more metatheoretical.
For discussion of the various issues involved see Cappelen and Lepore (2007).
12Pagin and Westerståhl explain that “(b) is the very weak requirement that one’s notion of meaning allows
some non-trivial synonymies” (382, footnote 1).
13In Pagin and Westerståhl (2010b), they develop a related proposal which makes use of multiple interpre-
tation functions, a simple version of which we rejected in §1.2. But Pagin and Westerståhl (2010c) develop the
proposal further, making use of the strategy of relativizing J.K to context types.
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the name of a city as its value, and the occurrence in 〈〈quote〉, 〈quote〉〉 has the name of a
name of a city as its value.
Since here we are only concerned with quotational linguistic contexts we will model
〈〉, 〈quote〉, 〈〈quote〉, 〈quote〉〉, etc., as 0, 1, 2, . . . , respectively. So to present their proposal,
let a number n ≥ 0 indicate that an expression is embedded under n-many quotation
operators. The relativized notion of compositionality says that each expression is assigned
a meaning, in a linguistic context, and that the meaning of a complex expression (in context)
is a function of the meanings of its constituents in their respective contexts. One may allow
that two unquoted expressions agree in meaning, for instance that JEdinburghK0 = Jthe
capital of ScotlandK0, while denying that enclosing them in quotes results in expressions
that agree in meaning, Jquote EdinburghK0 , Jquote the capital of ScotlandK0. The reason is
that a name in quotations must be evaluated in a different linguistic context from the name
unquoted.14 So it is possible that Jquote EdinburghK0 , Jquote the capital of ScotlandK0,
because the embedded expressions ‘Edinburgh’ and ‘the capital of Scotland’ must be
evaluated at a different linguistic context. They are evaluated relative to the linguistic
context of embedding under single quotation marks, modelled as 1. And, JEdinburghK1
, J the capital of ScotlandK1.
Pagin and Westerståhl advertise their view as a weakening of the principle of compo-
sitionality which implements Frege’s occurrence-based semantics.
. . . allowing for linguistic context dependence . . . we can obtain a semantics which is
compositional in the generalized sense [. . . ] The new semantics . . . will be very close
to adapting Frege’s view in Frege 1892 that quotation provides a context in which
expressions refer to themselves. (Pagin and Westerståhl 2010b: 275)
Since compositionality applies at the level of occurrences, Pagin and Westerståhl (2010c)
say that they can deliver a “straightforward” account of quotation that does not deny
substitution or deny synonymy, but which is nonetheless systematic. We take this to
mean that even if two expressions α and β have the same meanings in contexts with no
quotation marks and these very expressions may occur inside of quotation marks, the
result of encasing them in single quotation marks need not yield expressions with the
same meaning.
14As Pagin and Westerståhl (2010c: 397) say: “The first main idea for an extension of a semantic framework
to handle linguistic context dependence is that when a semantic function is applied to a term s, the value
depends on the relevant context type. The second main idea is that the context type of an immediate subterm
of a term s may be different from the context type of s itself.”
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This account treats the interpretation function, J.K, as a two-placed relation that takes an
expression and a linguistic context to yield a meaning. A prima facie reading of their view
would have Pagin and Westerståhl (2010c) saying that the expressions ‘Edinburgh’ and
‘the capital of Scotland’ simply do not have meanings, only their occurrences do. On this
prima facie reading, there is no single semantic axiom giving the meaning of an expression
such as ‘Edinburgh’ in all contexts. Rather, there are a sequence of functions that give
an expression various meanings: J.K0, J.K1, J.K2. . . We have JEdinburghK0 = Jthe capital of
ScotlandK0 but JEdinburghK1 , Jthe capital of ScotlandK1.
Pagin and Westerståhl (2010c: 386) insist that is possible to deliver an occurrence-
based compositional account of quotation in which (a) expressions genuinely occur inside
of quotations and (b) there are nontrivial synonyms.15 Unfortunately, while this naive
reading of their account is compositional it is not straightforward since it does not respect
clause (b). That is, it does not allow at least one case of two syntactically distinct and
quotable expressions (expressions!) to have the same meaning. Given this, the account is
not a genuine alternative to the standard diet of options, since the proposal collapses into
deny synonymy, and in fact it ends up denying that there are any synonymous expression
pairs whatsoever.
The deeper problem is that this prima facie reading simply revisits the ambiguity ap-
proach considered above in §1.2. There we considered approaches that introduce multiple
interpretation functions J.K$, J.K£, and J.Ke to explain substitution failures. The problem
with these approaches was that interpretation functions would have to be individually
learned rather than subsumed under a general semantic axiom giving the meaning of the
expression. This prima facie reading of Pagin and Westerståhl (2010c)—on which the vari-
ous interpretation functions J.K0, J.K1, J.K2. . . —are not subsumed under a single semantic
axiom suffers the same ills. The various meanings of an expression such as ‘Edinburgh’
are connected only by the fact that they are assigned to the word ‘Edinburgh’ just as the
various meanings of ‘bank’ are connected only by being assigned to the word ‘bank’.16
As before, what is wanted is a single semantic rule assigning a meaning to an expression
15“Our claim in this paper is that with a corresponding notion of linguistic context, the straightforward
account of quotation can be made compositional, in the general, contextual sense” (ibid.).
16Pagin and Westerståhl (2010c) contrast their own view with the expressions-in-context (or ambiguity)
approach (see their appendix 1). They insist: “While there are good reasons to let the lexicon distinguish two
or more meanings of bank, for example, there are no good reasons why the lexicon should care about quotation”
(409). They insist that their account has a single meaning assignment µ that evaluates an expression t in a
context c, whereas the alternative ambiguity account has disparate lexical entries, which are not governed by
a systematic rule.
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such as ‘Edinburgh’ all at once, in all different linguistic contexts. But this single semantic
rule would allow us to reconstruct a notion of expression meaning. The general rule would
assign the expression an occurrence meaning relative to a linguistic context. That is, one
can understand a novel sentence by understanding the expressions it contains and, in
particular, by knowing how their meanings vary in linguistic context. Adapting Fregean
terminology, Dummett calls this general semantic feature of an expression its one common
sense.
The sense of a word cannot vary from context to context, but is a property of the word
itself apart from any context: for it is by knowing the sense of the constituent words,
independently of their occurrence in this sentence, that we understand the sentence. If
the sense of a word varied from context to context, this would have to be according to
some general rule, if we were to understand the sentence in which it occurs: and then
this general rule would in reality constitute the one common sense which the word
possessed. (Dummett 1973: 268)
Synonymous expressions, then, would agree in Dummettian sense.
Effectively, facts about expression synonymy can be extracted from facts about expression-
in-context synonymy by requiring that synonymous expressions are synonymous at every
context. This common semantic value of the expression—equivalent to curry(J.K) which
we write as J.K∗—is a function which takes a linguistic context and outputs the meaning
of occurrences of the expression in the context.
J.K∗: expressions −→ (linguistic contexts −→ occurrence meanings)
But understood this way the approach does not differ from the standard diet of options.
The two-place function J.K may determine that expressions such as ‘Edinburgh’ and ‘the
capital of Scotland’ have the same meaning at one linguistic context, but different meanings
at another linguistic context. This is simply because the expressions have semantic values,
respectively JEdinburghK∗ and Jthe capital of ScotlandK∗, that differ tout court. But as
an account of substitution failure, this amounts to deny synonymy, the meaning of an
expression at a linguistic context does not exhaust its semantic contribution.
Indeed, Pagin and Westerståhl (2010c: 400) do reconstruct a notion of synonymy in
exactly these terms, which they call “total synonymy”. Two expressions exhibit total
synonymy just in case they are synonymous in every context. This is just to say that two
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expressions α and β are totally synonymous when JαK∗ = JβK∗. But then it follows that
there are no distinct, but totally synonymous expressions! Pagin and Westerståhl admit
just this when they say
if there is a quotation context type in E, then there will be no non-trivial total synonymy
pairs: a term s is totally synonymous only with itself. (ibid.: 400)
So Pagin and Westerståhl agree that their view allows a definition of expression syn-
onymy which entails that there are no (non-trivial) total synonyms. This undermines their
desiderata for a “straightforward” account of quotation: there is not “at least one case of
two syntactically distinct and quotable expressions having the same semantic interpreta-
tion”.
Pagin and Westerståhl (2010c: 399-400) do offer weaker notions of expression syn-
onymy. One notion designated synonymy stipulates a designated linguistic context, say 0,
and holds that two expressions are “synonymous” just in case JαK0 =JβK0.17 But this seems
to simply stipulate that quotation calls for special treatment. In our minds, this undermines
the point of the exercise. If all that is wanted is that the expressions agree semantically
in the unquoted contexts, then the view could be implemented even by someone who
has a notion of meaning assigned by the interpretation J.K∗. Even though ‘Edinburgh’
and ‘the capital of Scotland’ disagree in meaning in the absolute sense, JEdinburghK∗ ,Jthe capital of ScotlandK∗, they agree in meaning relative to unquoted contexts. That is,JEdinburghK∗(0) = Jthe capital of ScotlandK∗(0).
Consider an analogous position. In Kaplan’s (1989a) logic of demonstratives, the
meaning of an expression is its character, a function from extralinguistic contexts to con-
tents. Thus, the meaning of the first person pronoun ‘I’ is the agent of the context. On
this view, ‘I’ has a different meaning from any proper name, since proper names have
the same content in every context. However, one might put forward the view that the
first person pronoun ‘I’ and one’s own name exhibit designated synonymy, since they
agree in content whenever one utters them. Does this show that there is a deep semantic
connection between the first person pronoun and one’s name? We think not. Rather, we
take the example to illustrate that the notion of designated synonymy is not significant for
the theory of meaning.
17The other notion, use synonymy, requires that the two expressions mean the same in any non-quotation
context, which again is context 0 in our model.
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The general lesson here is that in order to account for the unified behaviour of an
expression—our ability to understand diverse sentences that contain it, the expression
must be assigned semantic properties by the semantic theory. In the occurrence-based
approaches, the relevant semantic properties of an expression are that it has various
meanings in various linguistic contexts. But then it will be natural to ask whether two
expressions are synonymous or not. If the expressions can occur in the same linguistic
contexts and yet differ in value in some of those contexts, then they cannot be synonymous.
Occurrence-based semantics, so construed, is not a genuine alternative to the standard
options for diagnosing failures in compositionality.
3 Variable binding
Variable binding is another salient stress test for compositionality. The worry begins with
the thought that a free variable contributes an object relative to an assignment. So two
variables ‘x’ and ‘y’ might have the same semantic value relative to an assignment σ: JxKσ
= JyKσ. It would follow that the variable contributes that object to sentences containing it,
when assessed relative to the same assignment. Consider the pair (7).
(7) (a) x , x
(b) x , y
Assuming that JxKσ = JyKσ, it follows that J(7a)Kσ = J(7b)Kσ. But the result of substituting
‘x’ for ‘y’ or (7a) for (7b) does not always result in a sentence with the same truth-value
relative to assignment σ. For example, consider the following:
(8) (a) ∃x x , x
(b) ∃x x , y
(8a) and (8b) differ by the substitution of ‘x’ for ‘y’ and of (7a) for (7b). Nonetheless, (8a)
is false on any assignment, but (8b) is true on any assignment (provided there are at least
two things). So J(8a)Kσ , J(8b)Kσ. Thus, in this case ‘x’ and ‘y’ are synonymous (in the
relevant sense) and (8b) is the result of substituting ‘y’ for ‘x’ in (8a), but the complex
expressions (8a) and (8b) are not synonymous (in the relevant sense). For these reasons
Soames (2011) says bluntly: “Compositionality even fails for Tarskian quantification”
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(129). This apparent compositionality failure threatens foundational presuppositions of
formal semantics.
The standard diet of options as applies to this case as well. The deny synonymy strategy
insists that even though JxKσ = JyKσ, the variables ‘x’ and ‘y’ are not fully synonymous,
since their semantic values are more fine-grained. In particular, the expressions are taken
to have as their semantic values functions from assignments into objects: JxK = λσ.σ(x)
and JyK = λσ.σ(y). As a result, JxK , JyK. In this way one can provide a compositional
semantics for quantification.18
The other prominent strategy is to deny substitution. This strategy insists that the
complex expressions ‘∃x x , x’ and ‘∃x x , y’ don’t in fact differ by the substitution of
(the synonymous) expressions ‘x’ and ‘y’. One traditional version of this strategy would
outright deny that the variables are constituents of the quantified formulae. For example,
on Frege’s view “variables” are simply typographic parts of the disconnected quantifier
sign serving only to link the quantifier to the open spaces in predicates.19 For Frege
variables are not expressions of the formal language, and thus talk of variables having
sense or being synonymous is simply incoherent.20
But one need not go so far. In particular one might think that variables are genuine
syntactic units and that ‘x’ and ‘y’ might be synonymous, but nevertheless deny substi-
tution. On this proposal, the synonymous expressions written as ‘x’ and ‘y’ in ‘x , y’
must be distinguished from the expressions with the same shape which occur embedded
in ‘∃x x , x’ and ‘∃x x , y’. To put the matter another way, a mark such as ‘x’ is am-
biguous. The mark corresponds to distinct lexical entries. As Salmon (2006) characterizes
this position, “the lower-case letter ‘x’ (qua variable) ambiguously represents two distinct
expressions: ‘x’-bound and ‘x’-free.”21 So on this account the formulae ‘∃x x , x’ and
‘∃x x , y’ do not differ by the substitution of synonymous expressions (namely, ‘x’-free and
‘y’-free), but rather by the substitution of their non-synonymous homonyms (‘x’-bound
and ‘y’-bound).22
18See Janssen (1997) and so-called cylindrified models. See also Lewis (1970), and more recent discussion
in Rabern (2012, 2013) and Yli-Vakkuri (2013).
19According to Frege, a quantifier sign ‘∃y . . . y . . .’ is saturated by a predicate ‘∀x x = . . .’ to form the
quantified expression ‘∃y∀x x = y’ (see Frege 1893/2013: §8). Likewise, for the Bourbaki collective who would
render a formula such as ‘∃x(Fx ∧ Gx)’ as a variable-less structure consisting of symbols, gaps, and wires
connecting symbols to gaps (see Bourbaki 1954).
20See Wehmeier (2018) and Pickel and Rabern (manuscript) “Against Fregean Quantification” for discussion.
21Salmon does not endorse this position, instead he attributes it to Jason Stanley.
22Kaplan (1989a: 489-90) explicitly adopts this view for free and bound pronouns of natural language.
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Thus, given the standard options one may deny synonymy: the semantic values of the
variables ‘x’ and ‘y’ and of the sentences (7a) for (7b) are in fact distinct (even though
they agree on assignment σ). Or, one may deny substitution: (8a) and (8b) do not differ
by the substitution of synonyms. Faced with this choice some cast about for a further
alternative in occurrence-based semantics. We now turn to examining the occurrence-
based approaches developed in Salmon (2006) and Glanzberg and King (2020). We argue
that neither present a genuine alternative. (Note that a careful reading of Salmon suggests
that he would not disagree with this conclusion, whereas Glanzberg and King require
their approach to not collapse into a standard approach given their theoretical motives.)
3.1 Salmon’s theory of bondage
Salmon (2006) self-consciously develops an occurrence-based semantics for variables in
the tradition of Frege.
In developing an occurrence-based semantics of variable-binding, I take my cue from
Frege’s theory of indirect (oblique, ungerade) contexts. [. . . ] Quantifiers are variable-
binding operators. Like ‘believes that’, variable-binding operators induce the variables
they bind to undergo semantic shift, but a shift of a different sort from intensional or
“indirect” (oblique) operators. (Salmon 2006: 420-421)
To outline Salmon’s picture we will follow his terminology and speak of an expression’s
“designatum” instead of its meanings or semantic value, but nothing turns on this. Salmon
distinguishes the designatum of an occurrence of an expression (at an assignment) unem-
bedded under a variable-binder from the designatum of an occurrence of an expression
embedded under a variable-binder (at an assignment).23 Thus Salmon distinguishes the
designatum of a free occurrence of a variable from the designatum of a bound occurrence
of a variable.
In response to the apparent compositionality failure above, Salmon insists on the
following: The free occurrences of variables ‘x’ and ‘y’ in (7b) designate the same individual
relative to σ. But in (8b), the occurrences of the variables under the quantifier take on
Kaplan (1989b) also states that “pronouns are lexically ambiguous, having both an anaphoric and a demon-
strative use” (572).
23Here we will only focus on occurrences of variables, in particular, even though Salmon’s theory applies
to all expressions generally (both simple and complex).
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designata distinct from their free designata (and also from each other). That is why (8b)
has a different designatum from (8a).
Salmon provides a systematic, rule-governed theory about the designata of a variable
in its different occurrences. For Salmon, the basic semantics relativizes an expression to a
linguistic context, which Salmon models as a sequence of variables corresponding to the
sequence of quantifiers the expression is embedded under. Letting β be a variable, the
designatum of β when unembedded (modelled as the empty sequence ∅) relative to an
assignment σ is the value of the function σ as applied to the variable.
JβK∅,σ = σ(β)
So the free occurrences of variables ‘x’ and ‘y’ might have the same designatum under some
assignment σ. When a variable β is embedded under some variable-binding operator, such
as the quantifier ‘∃α’, the variable shifts its designatum. Relative to the context of being
embedded under a binder indexed with the variable α, the variable β designates a function
that takes an individual i and outputs the value of a free occurrence of β at an assignment
that differs from σ at most by assigning i to α.
JβKα,σ = λi.JβK∅,σ[α/i],
As a result, the occurrences of ‘x’ and ‘y’ embedded under the quantifier in (8b) designate
λi.σ[x/i](x) and λi.σ[x/i](y), respectively. The former is the identity function λi.i, while the
latter is the constant function which takes a member of the domain an outputs σ(y). These
are different functions, so relative to σ and the linguistic context of being embedded under
‘∃x’, the variables ‘x’ and ‘y’ have different designata. Salmon generalizes this treatment
to a variable embedded under n-quantifiers (modeled as a sequence of n variables).24
So far so good. This account is in working order. However, those looking to Salmon for
an alternative to the standard diet of responses to apparent compositionality failures will
be disappointed. Given that there is a linguistic context where distinct variables ‘x’ and
‘y’ have distinct designata, it follows that ‘x’ and ‘y’ have distinct (total) semantic values.
So, much like the discussion in the previous section, this approach collapses into deny
synonymy. For the record, we do not think of our stance as a challenge to anything Salmon
says. Salmon himself says that the various meanings assigned by the occurrence-based
semantics are in fact semantic values of the expressions themselves.
24The recursive clause for the designata of a variable’s occurrences, following (Salmon 2006: 427) may be
stated as: JβK〈α1 ,...,αn ,αn+1〉,σ = λi.JβK〈α1 ,...,αn〉,σ[αn+1/i].
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The two approaches [occurrence-based and expression-based], though different, are
not intrinsically in conflict. [. . . ] Frege’s occurrence-based semantics in fact assigns
semantic values both to expressions and their occurrences, even while honoring his
Context Principle. His notions of customary designatum, indirect sense, doubly in-
direct designatum, and the like, are semantic values of the expression itself. The
customary designatum is the designatum of the expression’s occurrences in “custom-
ary” settings, that is, its occurrences that are in extensional position and not within
the scope of a variable-binding operator. (Salmon 2006: 432)
Thus for Salmon the semantic value of an expression seems to be the function that takes a
linguistic context c and outputs its designatum in c. Then the result is in accord with our
conclusion that the expressions ‘x’ and ‘y’ have different semantic values. So the proposal
ultimately denies that these expressions are synonymous and thereby does not expand on
the standard diet of responses.25
3.2 Glanzberg and King on type adjusting
Glanzberg and King (2020) are concerned to defend a traditional account of the relationship
between compositional semantics and the objects of assertion and belief—in primarily
natural as opposed to formal languages.26 The worry they are addressing starts from
the observation that natural language contains expressions of the same syntactic type as
complete sentences that can be non-vacuously embedded under quantifiers.27 Consider
25Given this on might think that the Salmon-style semantics—with its relativization to linguistic contexts—
is unnecessarily complicated. If the concern is simply to provide a compositional treatment of the language of
first-order logic, then why not just resort to the relatively simpler strategy of raising all the semantic types to be
assignment sensitive (e.g. let JxK = λσ.σ(x) and JyK = λσ.σ(y))? We agree, but take it that Salmon is motivated
by issues that are separable from compositional semantics per se. Salmon seems primarily concerned with
the semantic content of an expression (or occurrence thereof)—in the sense of its corresponding constituent
in a structured proposition—and thinks that “occurrence-based semantics illuminates”, since it “upholds
intuitions about what is actually mentioned” (Salmon 2006: 418). In particular, Salmon is concerned with
the contribution a bound occurrence of a variable in a sentence makes to the proposition expressed by the
sentence. Any such account must eventually confront the antimony of the variable, see Fine (2003). Salmon
(2006: 426 footnote 14) sketches his solution in terms of his bondage semantics; see also the related solution
in Pickel and Rabern (2016).
26This recent work builds in certain ways on King (2003) and Glanzberg (2011). See also Cappelen and
Hawthorne (2009) and Schaffer (forthcoming).
27The problem here is an instance of the more general problem that sentences embed under various shifty
operators and thus require semantic values that are richer than propositions (Lewis 1980). See Ninan (2010)
and Rabern (2012, 2017) for elaboration. See also literature on so-called “operator arguments”, e.g., Fritz et al.
(2019).
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the fact that according to many approaches to natural language syntax, any sentence which
contains a quantifier in its direct object position such as (9) has an underlying LF where
the quantifier has moved outside the scope of the sentence but leaves a co-indexed trace
as in (10).
(9) John saw everyone.
(10) Everyone1 [John saw t1]
The structure (10) contains two immediate constituent expressions ‘Everyone1’ and the
“open sentence” (11).
(11) John saw t1
Following the standard semantics of Heim and Kratzer (1998), Glanzberg and King rela-
tivize the semantic value of this open sentence to an assignment (a` la Tarski). In particular,
the semantic value of (11) relative to an assignment σwill be the proposition that John saw
σ1 (though in their presentation they simplify and treat this as a truth-value).
But this treatment raises obvious compositionality difficulties, because two open sen-
tences may express the same proposition relative to an assignment, yet embed differently
in larger quantified constructions. Contrast (11) with (12).
(12) John saw t2.
These two open sentences express the same proposition relative to any assignment σ for
which σ1 = σ2. But if the proposition expressed by a sentence is its compositional semantic
value, then expressions differing by the substitution of (11) for (12) should have the same
semantic values at assignment σ. But these expressions do not embed the same way under
a quantifier such as ‘Everyone1’.
(10) Everyone1 [John saw t1]
(13) Everyone1 [John saw t2]
(10) is true at σ just in case John saw everyone, but (13) is true at σ just in case John saw
σ2. So they do not have the same semantic values at σ. (There is an obvious worry here
that ‘Everyone1 [John saw t2]’ does not result from movement in any natural language
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sentence. We use this example to simplify a point which could be made by contrasting
‘Everyone1 [Someone2 [t1 saw t2]]’ and ‘Everyone1 [Someone2 [t2 saw t1]]’, which may
result from movement in the natural language sentences ‘everyone saw someone’ and
‘someone saw everyone’, respectively.28)
The standard diet of responses are obviously available here. One might deny synonymy
by holding that the expressions (11) and (12) are not genuinely synonymous. On this
approach, the meaning of an open sentence is given by the function it determines from
assignments to propositions. Two sentences are synonymous if they determine the same
function. Alternatively, one might deny substitution, by arguing that (11) does not occur
in (10). The latter option would be a direct challenge to natural language syntax. So
Glanzberg and King offer the hope for a third way, which at a certain level of abstraction
resembles Salmon’s theory of binding considered above. Glanzberg and King insist that
occurrence-based semantics has the virtue of retaining the classical view on the relationship
between semantic value and content.
Glanzberg and King aim to vindicate the thought that unembedded sentences (11) and
(12) have the same semantic values at σ. So they endorse JJohn saw t1Kσ = JJohn saw
t2Kσ. Moreover, they endorse some version of the thesis that the meaning of a complex
expression at an assignment is a function of the meanings of the expressions from which
it derives at that assignment. So they need to explain how it is possible that JEveryone1
[John saw t1]Kσ , JEveryone1 [John saw t2]Kσ.
Their explanation appeals to “type adjusting”. In particular, they treat the indexed
quantifier ‘Everyone1’ as looking to combine with a predicate value, a function from term
meanings to sentence meanings. When embedded under such an operator, they insist that
a sentence shifts its meaning to a “type adjusted meaning”. In particular, the type adjusted
meaning of a sentence γ at assignment σ when embedded under a quantifier numerically
indexed by α is the function which takes an individual i from the domain and outputs the
value of γ assessed at the assignment σ[α/i], which assigns i to the numerical index α.
Appealing to this type shifting rule allows Glanzberg and King to retain the basic
thought that the semantic value of a complex expression at an assignment is a function of
the semantic values of its syntactic components at that very same assignment. The trick is
28One could also make a similar point by appealing to cases with bound pronouns (instead of traces), e.g.
‘every man thinks that he is clever’, but this raises further issues concerning how to treat free and bound
pronouns that we wish to avoid here. See Rabern (2013) and Yli-Vakkuri (2013) for arguments along these
lines.
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that the various occurrences of an expression may have distinct semantic values (even when
assessed relative to the same assignment). The relevant semantic values for the principle
of compositionality are their “type adjusted meanings” and not their “normal meanings”.
So in the context of ‘Everyone1 [John saw t1]’, the type adjusted meaning of ‘John saw t1’
relative to σ is λi.JJohn saw t1Kσ[1/i]. By way of contrast, in the context of ‘Everyone1 [John
saw t2]’, the type adjusted meaning of ‘John saw t2’ relative to σ is λi.JJohn saw t2Kσ[1/i]. As
a result, the type adjusted meanings of (11) and (12) are distinct at σ and so make different
contributions as they occur in (10) and (13).29
So for Glanzberg and King, the “type adjusted semantic values” of a sentence embed-
ded under a quantifier with index α at assignment σwill be a function that takes an object
i and outputs the sentence’s unembedded semantic value at σ[α/i]. This corresponds
exactly to the shifted semantic value of as sentence embedded under a single quantifier
posited by Salmon, which we discussed above. So we purportedly have a single uni-
vocal expression which takes on different semantic values relative to σ depending on its
linguistic context.
Does this proposal expand the standard diet of options? Recall from our discussion
above that even an occurrence-based semantics must have a notion of expression synonymy,
whereby two expressions are synonymous when they share meanings in their various
occurrences. In the context of Glanzberg and King, two sentences would be synonymous
only if for any index α and assignment σ, embedding them under a quantifier indexed by
α produces the same type adjusted meaning relative to σ. Glanzberg and King seem to
agree.
. . . type adjusted meanings of expressions should be defined up from the meanings
originally assigned to those expressions, which in our case will be the semantic values
of these expressions, relative to parameters. We should be able to get the type adjusted
meanings from the meanings assigned by our semantic theory. (Glanzberg and King
2020: 17)
Clearly, the type adjusted meaning of an expression at an assignment σ such as (11) is not a
function of its unembedded semantic value at σ, since the unembedded semantic value of
(11) at σ is the same as the unembedded semantic value of (12) at σ, but their type adjusted
meanings differ.
29That is, λi.JJohn saw t1Kσ[1/i] , λi.JJohn saw t2Kσ[1/i].
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Noting this, Glanzberg and King observe that the expression meaning assigned to (11)
cannot be its semantic value at σ. Rather, they say:30
. . . [W]e should really think of [an expression] γ as having a family of meanings relative
to σ corresponding to different choices of what gets assigned to [numerical index] α.
As a result, we cannot think of JγKσ for a specific choice of σ as capturing the meaning
of γ in the intuitive sense. For of course, it may be that JγKσ = JψKσ even though
for another choice of assignment function σ∗: JγKσ∗ , JψKσ∗ and γ and ψ intuitively
mean different things (‘α skis’ vs. ‘α surfs’). Hence, it is only the family of meanings
that in any intuitive sense captures the meaning of γ. [. . . ] we need more than
the meaning assigned to γ by our meaning assignment (=JγKσ). In the case of [type
adjusted meanings due to quantifiers], what is needed is what we’ve called the family
of meanings of γ relative to σ. . . (Glanzberg and King 2020: 17)
So in order to predict the type adjusted meaning on the basis of the expression meaning—
which is required for keeping their theory “compositionally kosher”—Glanzberg and
King posit a notion of expression meaning which is determined by a family of meaning
assignments. In particular, for each index α, there will be a meaning assignment to γ
returning λi.JγKσ[α/i]. Two expressions γ and ψ are synonymous relative to σ, when the
meaning assignment for γ and ψ at σ agree relative to any index α.
On this approach the overall meaning assigned to an expression is given by its family
of meanings. Two expressions agree in meaning at an assignment when they determine
the same function from numerical indices to type adjusted meanings. Since the meaning
assignments to (11) and (12) will differ for some choices of α, they have different families
of meanings relative to σ. So they are not synonymous in the relevant sense. As a result,
Glanzberg and King should not be seen as expanding the standard diet of options. Rather,
they deny synonymy in response to the apparent failure of compositionality.
Given this they seem to be abandoning their preferred picture whereby sentential
meaning is identified with the objects of assertion and belief. The total semantic value
of a sentence (relative to an assignment) is not a proposition. A sentence has a family
of meaning values—a family of type adjusted meanings—that are appealed to do the
compositional work. Thus, the semantic value assigned to a sentence is given by its family
of meanings. And two sentences agree in semantic value when they have the same family
30We uniformly replace their notation with our own.
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of meanings—that is, two sentences agree in semantic value when they determine the same
function from linguistic environments to “type adjusted meanings”. Thus, the semantic
value of a sentence (relative to an assignment) is not a proposition, instead it is a collection
of occurrence meanings where one of those meanings is a proposition. So their view rejects
the classical picture: the semantic values of sentence types are not propositional.31
4 Conclusion
We have argued that it is a myth that Frege-inspired occurrence-based semantics affords
a genuine alternative strategy to the standard expression-based semantics. Occurrence-
based approaches fall squarely into the standard general strategies for resolving compo-
sitionality failures.
When Frege’s remarks are construed in terms of the method of direct discourse, we
argued that it amounts to positing ambiguity when faced with an apparent violation of
compositionality. Thus it clearly collapses into the standard deny substitution option. If
instead the Fregean doctrine of “reference shift” is construed in terms of the method of
indirect discourse as positing more sophisticated semantic rules, we argued that it amounts
to enriching the semantic values. While this method has the virtues of systematicity and
the avoidance of brute ambiguities, we argued that is ultimately collapses into the other
standard option: deny synonymy.
Our two case studies, Pagin and Westerståhl (2010c) on quotation and Salmon (2006)
and Glanzberg and King (2020) on variable binding, support our claim. The lesson in
each case was a general one that would apply to occurrence-based treatments of any
linguistic construction. On the occurrence-based approach (without brute ambiguities) a
single expression has a diverse family of occurrence meanings—for each linguistic context
a meaning from the family is employed to do the compositional work. We insist that
the semantic value of an expression should be understood as the value assigned to the
expression type that accounts for its contribution to truth-conditions across all the linguistic
contexts in which it can occur. Lewis said it well when he said:
To be a semantic value is to be a big enough package of information. A semantic value
worthy of the name must carry all the information that will be needed to generate
31See Stanley (1997), Ninan (2010), Yalcin (2014), and Rabern (2012, 2017) for discussion of the alternative
picture which has roots in Dummett (1973), Evans (1979), and Lewis (1980).
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other semantic values. Anything that we need to bundle together many of to get a big
enough package is ipso facto not an adequate semantic value. (Lewis 1986: 44)
Thus, when a semantic theory is construed in an occurrence-based way the total semantic
value assigned to an expression is given by its entire family of occurrence meanings. Two
expressions agree in semantic value when they have the same family of meanings (viz.
when they determine the same function from linguistic contexts to occurrence meanings).
Thus, positing a difference in occurrence meaning requires a difference in meaning tout
court. The strategy, then, ultimately amounts to enriching semantic values. And while en-
riching semantic values in order to avoid failures of compositionality may be theoretically
motivated in many cases, it is, of course, nothing new.
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